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I 
Optimal ''Green'' Payments to Meet Chance Constraints on Nitrate Leaching Under 
Price and Yield Risk 
Abstract 
A program of "green" payments is designed for fanners to voluntarily reduce 
nitrate leaching by restricting nitrogen application on com. Price and weather risk are 
considered, infonnation is asymmetric, and environmental quality is regulated by chance 
constraints. Empirically, risk and asymmetric infonnation have implications for the value 
of infonnation, program costs, and producer benefits. 
-

Optimal ''Green'' Payments to Meet Chance Constraints on Nitrate Leaching Under Price 
and Yield Risk 
u.s. agricultural programs to redistribute income from taxpayers and consumers toward 
fanners are characterized by their variety and voluntary nature (Chambers, 1992). This variety is 
reflected in the environmental provisions of recent fann bills, whereby eligibility for fann subsidies is 
conditioned on the adoption of conservation measures, and in the market-oriented proposals to 
reduce environmental damage. As pressure to reduce agricultural subsidies mounts, we must 
identify creative policies to reduce environmental damage from agricultural production. 
As an alternative to taxes or quantity restrictions on environmental residuals or on chemical 
inputs, Wu and Babcock (1995) discuss the optimal design of a "green" payment program under 
asymmetric infonnation. Their policy is designed to maximize the social surplus from agricultural 
production, which is equal to fann income less the social cost of pollution and the marginal social 
cost of raising tax revenue to support the government payments. The program is voluntary, and 
"green" payments to farmers, as an incentive to adopt environmentally sound production practices, 
are designed for farms with different resource situations. Payment levels are set so that producers 
have no incentive to choose an option intended for another group. Their analysis assumes that net 
returns and environmental damages are known with certainty; it was also necessary to set the social 
costs of pollution and of raising tax revenue at arbitrary levels. 
This paper extends the analysis of this type of "green" payment scheme in several important 
ways. Two sources of risk are considered. Following Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1988) and Zhu, 
et at. (1994), the government's policy objectives are articulated as a chance constraint which limits 
-

the probability of severe environmental damage. The self-selection or incentive compatibility 
constraint, which insures producers have no incentive to select the Wrong option, recognizes both 
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price risk and yield risk due to weather. We estimate the additional government cost resulting from 
the asymmetric information concerning the resource endowments of farm groups. The model is 
formulated to examine "green" payments to reduce nitrogen fertilizer application on com to control 
nitrate leaching and runoff, but it can be modified in obvious ways to examine other "green" 
payments for the adoption of other environmentally sound practices. 
The Model 
A "green" payment scheme compensates farmers for their choice of environmentally sound 
production practices. The government presents producers with a policy menu, each item consisting 
of a particular production practice (such as specific input or output levels or production techniques) 
and an associated government payment Each item on the menu is designed for farms with a 
particular resource endowment or other distinguishing characteristic, but the government either has 
insufficient information to classify farms by this criterion or avoids using it as an overt basis for 
setting program payments (Chambers, 1992). This asymmetry of information, combined with the 
facts that the program is voluntary and each item on the menu is available to farmers in all groups, 
requires that payments be set so that there is no incentive for farmers select the wrong option. In 
our model, the government formulates the policy menu in two steps. First, the desired production 
practice for each group is determined, and second, the payment to induce producers to adopt those 
production practices is set. 
For simplicity, but with no loss of generality, consider two groups of farmers (i = 1,2). Each 
group produces com, but is differentiated by the quality of land Both com yield, Y; =y;(N;,W;IC;), ­
and nitrate leaching and runoff, L; = I; (N;,W~IC;), per acre are functions of nitrogen applied (N;), 
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weather (W;), and given soil characteristics (C;). One can assume that dYlaN; > 0, dL;/dN; > 0, dY;ld 
W; > 0, and dL;/dW; > 0. Initial nitrogen fertilizer levels are at NiO and yields are YiO. Net return is 
RiO = PyiO - rNjo, where r is the price of nitrogen and P is the net return per bushel, exclusive of 
nitrogen cost. With weather and net returns for corn as random variables, the cumulative distribution 
function (c.d.f.) for this net return is F;(R;oINjo ) =1/;(tjIN;oXitj . 
The government's objective is to minimize the cost of insuring that on a11land in corn, the 
probability of combined leaching and runoff exceeding L* is less than or equal to a. In step 1, 
nitrogen levels, N;, are selected for each group that satisfy this constraint. In step 2, assuming that 
fanners are risk averse, the green payments must be set so that the post-policy distribution of net 
return for each group who self select the appropriate policy dominates the pre-policy distribution by 
second degree stochastic dominance (SSD).1 Assuming A; acres in each group, the problem 
becomes: 
(1) Min. L; A; S; 
(2) subject to P[/; (N;,W;ICj ) ~ L*] S; a, (i =1,2), 
(3)
 
(4)
 
-
(5) F/(Rll+SI INI) ~ F/(R12+S2 1N2), 
(6) F/(R22+S2 1N2) ~ F/ (R21+SI INI), 
1 Assuming that producers prefer more income to less and are risk averse, i.e., U'(R) >0 and U"(R) < 0, the 
conditions for SSD can be used to represent producers' preferences over distributions of net returns (Hadar and 
Russell, 1969). Under SSD, an alternative F dominates G if the area under the c.dJ. of F is nowheli more tI\fUl that of 
G and is somewhere less than the area under the c.dJ. of G. OrO/F dominates G if and only if F'(Y).5. ~(Y), with 
R 
strict inequality for at least one value of Y, where r(Y) = JF(t)dt . 
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for possible values of Rij + S;, with a strict inequality for at least one value, where Fl(Rij I N; ) = 
R..JF; {tijIN; )dtij' and where the subscripts ij refer to the net returns to the ,.til group evaluated at 
-
nitrogen levels designed for the}.tII group (j =0 corresponds to pre-policy returns for group I). N; 
and S; are the post-policy nitrogen and "green" payment levels for group i, respectively. The "green" 
payment for the pre-policy situation is zero for both groups. This model is the mechanism design 
problem that the government faces in formulating a policy that will operate under these 
circumstances. The government's solution will lead to a policy menu including three items: no 
participation and no payment, (NaJ,O), and production practices designed for producers in each group 
Because most of the equations in the model are conditions for SSD, it is impossible to solve 
this model analytically, but one can draw general conclusions about the nature of the policy menu. 
Equations (2) are the chance constraints on nitrate leaching and runoff, whereas equations (3) and 
(4) guarantee that the post-distribution of net returns plus the "green" payment dominates the pre-
policy distribution of net returns by SSD for each group individually. To meet the chance constraint, 
it is reasonable that N; < NaJ, Yii < YaJ, and Rii < RaJ. Thus, for equations (3) and (4) to hold, S; > o. 
In addition, the SSD conditions in (5) and (6) guarantee that producers in group i will self select the 
policy designed for that group and will have no incentive to choose an option designed for other 
groups. These equations, called self-selection constraints, are particularly difficult to disentangle 
analytically, because even though nitrogen levels are reduced for both groups, Nj < = > NiO• This, 
combined with the fact that the yield response functions differ, implies that Rij < => RaJ , and ifRij > 
-
RaJ then the "green" payment needed to meet the self-selection conditions may be larger than what is 
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necessary to satisfy only conditions (3) and (4). Put differently, the "green" payments required for 
self-selection could be higher than those required if infonnation was not asymmetric and producers 
could only volunteer for the program designed for their group. This difference is the opportunity 
cost of infonnation. 
An Application to Corn Production in New York 
This model is applied to production of com silage in central New York, the two groups of 
producers having soils with different yield and nitrogen leaching potential. Soils for group 1 are 
typical of those in hydrologic group A, while those for group 2 are typical for hydrologic group B. 
These soils are the most suitable for raising com, and according to National Resources Inventory and 
soils data from over 150 fanns, about 10% and 50% of New York's cropland are in hydrologic 
groups A and B, respectively (Boisvert, et al., 1995 and Thomas, 1994). The distributions of yields, 
nitrate leaching and runoff, and net returns are simulated using com and fertilizer prices and weather 
data for a 3D-year period, beginning in 1963. Com silage prices are based on a com grain 
equivalent, and prices and production costs are converted to constant 1992 dollars. Variable 
production costs for com excluding nitrogen are taken from com enterprise budgets in Schmit, and 
USDA-ERS. 
The Data and Initial Production Levels 
Silage yields (tons/acre) for the two groups (Yj) are simulated from yield functions, which 
depend on nitrogen application in IbsJacre (N), growing season rainfall in inches (W), and 
accumulated growing degree days during the growing season (G). The data used to estimate these 
yield relationships were from field trials at several sites in New York. Averaging the replications of ­
each fertilization level at each site generated 66 observations of yield, fertilization rates, and weather. 
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The model was estimated with slope and intercept dummy variables for soils by hydrologic group. 
The Yj equation is for soils in hydrologic group A; Y2 is for the soils in hydrologic group B. The 
estimated yield equations (t-ratios) are (R1 =0.72)2: 
Y;= 16.32 +O.096N 4J.OOO3N 2 +1.56W +0.0070 4J.0018N x W 
(-10.09) (6.32) (-4.43) (5.49) (3.23) (-1.51) 
Y2 = 11.17 +O.096N 4J.0002N 2 +O.066W +0.0070 4J.0018N x W 
(-3.17) (1.15) (-5.32) 
Estimates of nitrate leaching and runoff are from statistical relationships relating nitrate 
leaching and runoff on New York soils to nitrogen application, five soil characteristics, and several 
rainfall variables (table 1). They are estimated from runoff and leaching data generated by GLEAMS 
(Leonard et al., 1987) representing 1,350 combinations of weather, soil characteristics, and nitrogen 
levels. Using predicted values of runoff in the leaching equation was equivalent to an instrumental 
variable procedure for this recursive system (Judge et al., 1988). To help in the interpretation of 
these functions that are quadratic in logarithms (Bailey and Boisvert, 1991), the elasticities of 
leaching and runoff are reported for mean levels of the important explanatory variables, and for the 
most part, have the expected signs. Further, Boisvert et al. (1995) report that the leaching equation 
predicts well, particularly in the upper tail which is most critical for policy purposes. 
To begin the policy experiment, the second-degree stochastic efficient (SSE) set of nitrogen 
application rates was determined using a program in Anderson, et al. (1977). The SSE nitrogen 
fertilization rates range from 129 to 138 lbs./acre for group 1, and 142 to 160 lbs./acre for group 2. 
It seemed reasonable to set initial rates of nitrogen fertilization at the midpoints of these ranges. 
These rates are in table 2, along with the corresponding averages and standard deviations in 
­
1Since the equations were estimated in a pooled regression, t-ratios reported for the second equation correspond to 
interaction tenns with the group 2 dummy variable, i.e., the t-ratios given correspOnd to D2, DixN 1, and D2xW. 
respectively. 
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Table 1. Regression Equations for Nitrogen Runoff and Leaching 
Runoff Leaching 
Variable* Description Coef. t-ratio Elast. Coef. t-ratio Elast. 
Constant -4.402 -7.02 
L(NITRUN)** Nitrogen runoff (lbsJacre) 
L(NITRUN)SQ 
L(Hl) Soil horizon depth (in.) 
L(SLP) Average field slope (%) 
L(SLP)L(Hl) 
L(KAY) K erodibility factor 0.058 2.09 
L(KAY)L(Hl) 
L(ORG) Organic Matter (%) 3.241 9.24 
(LORG)SQ -1.039 -8.47 
L(ORG)L(Hl) 
L(MINN) Nitrogen mineralized by soil (lbs./acre) -0.581 -6.60 
L(RAIN) Total annual rainfall (in.) 0.652 15.27 
L(PRSTM) Rainfall 14 days of plan (in.)* 0.089 5.94 
(LPRSTM)SQ++ 0.023 6.47 
L(NIT)L(pRSTM) 
L(FRSTM) Rain w/in 14 days of fert. (in.)* 
(LFRSTM)SQ 0.005 5.82 
L(LBMAN) Total fertilizer (lbs./acre)** 0.628 7.05 
L(ROT) Years of corn in rotation 
LAGCORN Dummy, corn previous year 
L(HRSTM) Rain w/in 14 days ofhar. (in.)* 
HYDA Dummy, hydrologic soil group A+ -0.453 -23.06 
HYDB Dummy, hydrologic soil group B+ -0.359 -22.11 
MANURE++ Dummy, manure application 
0.06 
0.26 
-0.58 
0.65 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.63 
-75.568 -9.35 
-6.739 -4.38 -4.52 
2.119 1.76 
5.638 7.33 0.21 
-1.154 -4.37 -0.46 
0.453 2.66 
-5.594 -7.91 -2.11 
2.287 6.80 
5.235 5.51 2.00 
-2.127 -5.01 
5.442 5.81 5.44 
5.768 9.33 5.77 
0.10 
0.056 3.34 
0.363 3.75 
0.256 5.05 0.10 
0.094 6.59 
4.824 4.78 4.82 
-0.627 -4.55 -0.63 
-0.668 -6.49 
0.039 1.18 0.04 
0.290 2.87 
0.235 1.62 
Source: Boisvert. et a/ •• 1995.
 
·Except for the dummy variables. the variables are logarithmic transformations; some of the variables represent
 
a square of the logarithm (sq) or the product of two logarithms. NlTRUN is the logarithm of estimated runoff 
from the runoff equations. 
"Chi-square test statistics for heteroskedasticity were 229 for the runoff equation and 246 for the leaching 
equations. Standard errors were recalculated as the square root of the diagonal elements 
of the estimated asymptotic covariance matrix. These standard errors are consistent (White. 1980). 
'70 purge the runoff variables from any unexplained random component, the predicted values from the runoff equation ­
are used in the leaching equation (Judge et a/.• 1988). 
++Commezeial fertilizer application is combined with the nitrogen equivalent included in the various rates of 
manure application; any differential effect is captured through a dummy variable. 
Table 2. Yields, Net Returns, "Green" Payments and Nitrate Leaching and Runoff, by Fann Group and Safety Level 
Safety Level (Nitrate Leaching and Runoff, IbJacret 
Item 
Nitrogen Fertilizer Applied (lbJacre) 
66' 
133 
40 
99 
Group 1 
35 30 
92 84 
25 
75 
20 
63 
50' 
151 
40 
128 
Group 2 
35 30 
119 109 
25 
98 
20 
80 
Leaching and Runoff (lbJacre) 
Mean 
Standani Deviation 
38.6 
19.5 
24.7 
11 
22.6 
9.8 
20.4 
8.6 
18.4 
7.5 
16.1 
6.4 
34.2 
16.8 
24.6 
10.9 
22.5 
9.7 
20.4 
8.5 
18.5 
7.5 
16.1 
6.3 
Com Silage Yield (tons/acret 
Mean 
Standanl Deviation 
20.3 
4.21 
19.5 
4.41 
19.3 
4.46 
19.0 
4.50 
18.6 
4.56 
18.0 
4.63 
17.3 
1.09 
16.7 
0.98 
16.4 
0.94 
16.0 
0.89 
15.6 
0.85 
14.8 
0.78 
Net Returns From Com Production ($/acre) 
Mean 188 
Standanl Deviation 108 
184 
110 
182 
111 
179 
111 
174 
111 
165 
112 
121 
53 
118 
51 
115 
50 
111 
49 
106 
48 
96 
46 
00 
"Green" Payment ($/acre) 10 15 20 26 39 4 6 10 15 25 
Mean Net Revenue ~ 
Including "Green" Payments ($/acre) 194 197 199 200 203 121 121 121 121 121 
Average Loss in Net Returns From Com 
Production ($/acre)d 4 7 10 14 23 4 6 10 82 92 
Green Payment in Absence 
of Self-Selection ($/acret 7 10 13 18 28 4 6 10 
• L· from equation (2), for a. =0.1 6 Implicit safety levels associated with pre-policy nitrogen awlication levels. 
c Assumes 15% field and other losses. d This is the loss in revenue from reduced nitrogen application regarding "green" payments. 
e "Green" payments if appropriate policies can be assigned by group (Le., symmetric infonnation; ignoring equations (5) and (6». 
15 25 
'. 
I 
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combined leaching and runoff, yields (adjusted for 15% field losses), and net returns. Soils for group 
1 are slightly more productive than for group 2 (20 vs. 17 tons/acre), but yields and net returns are 
more variable. Relative to the mean, net returns are more variable for both groups than are yields. 
Since yield variability is affected only by weather, most of the variability in net returns is due to 
price. Average leaching is about 39 and 34 lbs./acre for groups 1 and 2, respectively; it is more 
variable on group 1 soils. 
The Safety Levels 
For the policy experiment, five safety levels for the chance constraints (equation (2» were 
selected, L* =40, 35, 30, 25, and 20 lbs./acre, and the probability of exceeding these levels was set 
at a =0.1. As a point of reference, according to the 3D-year empirical distributions in figures 1 and 
2, the implied safety levels for combined leaching and runoff corresponding to the initial nitrogen 
application rates (the level of nitrate leaching and runoff which is exceeded in only 3 out of the 30 
years) are 66lbs./acre for group 1 and 50 lbs./acre for group 2. To identify the reduction in nitrogen 
application rates needed to reach the four more stringent safety levels, successively lower rates were 
substituted into the nitrate leaching and runoff functions in Boisvert et al. (1995) until the other 
empirical distributions in figures 1 and 2 were obtained. To meet the safety level of 35 lbs./acre, for 
example, commercial fertilizer application would have to fall to about 92 and 119 lbs./acre for the 
two groups, respectively. As expected, for more stringent safety levels, the means and standard 
deviations in leaching fall. Average yields fall as well, but yield variability increases slightly for 
group 1. 
-

10 
Figure 1. Distribution of Nitrate leaching and Runoff on Group 1 Solis, 
Alternative Safety Levels 
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Figure 2. Distribution of Nitrate leaching and Runoff for Group 2 Solis, 
Alternative Safety Levels 
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Note: The safety levels in the legends are the same as those described in table 2. 
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The "Green" Payments 
Because our model cannot be solved analytically, an iterative strategy was used to identify 
the appropriate size of "green" payments to induce voluntary participation by each group. The most 
basic requirement of the "green" payments is that they provide an incentive for producers in both 
groups to participate in the program. Accordingly, for each safety level, the smallest value of Si, for 
which the distribution of post-policy net returns designed for each group dominates its pre-policy 
distribution, was calculated by successively incrementing Si from zero. These distributions were 
ranked against the initial situation,again using the program in Anderson et al. (1977). The payments 
derived in this way correspond to the situation where the government's policy mechanism ignores 
self-selection conditions. Put differently, these are the payments needed to induce voluntary 
participation if the government could identify a producer's group and offer only the policy designed 
for that group. For this situation, the "green" payments required range from $7 to $28/acre, and $4 
to $25/acre for groups 1 and 2, respectively (table 2). 
Where information is asymmetric, "green" payments must be set so that producers will 
voluntarily select the proper policy option, otherwise the chance constraints will be violated. The 
payments required in order to satisfy these self-selection conditions may be higher still. In our case, 
without such an added incentive, group 1 producers would also select group 2's policy because the 
payment, relative to the reduction in net returns, would be larger. If, for example, L* = 30 is judged 
to be the appropriate safety level, the distribution of net returns for group 1 producers choosing 
• 
(N2,S2) =(109,10) will dominate the distribution of net returns if,(NJ,Sl) =(84,13) is chosen. As a 
-
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result, the "green" payments associated with group 1 policy options must be increased significantly, 
ranging from $10 to $39/acre, compared with $4 to $25/acre for group 2 (table 2)3. 
Policy Implications 
In this paper, we have developed a strategy for designing "green" payments needed for 
voluntary adoption of environmentally sound management practices where price and yield risk are 
considered explicitly and environmental quality is defined according to chance constraints on the 
level of environmental damage. In our empirical application to New York, groups of farmers are 
offered payments to reduce nitrate leaching and runoff by restricting nitrogen application on com, 
under the assumption that farmers respond in a risk averse way. Price uncertainty is an important 
source of risk, since the yield variability due to weather (the one random factor also affecting the 
level of nitrate leaching) accounted for only a small proportion of variability in total net returns. 
From a policy perspective, the higher "green" payments to one group to insure voluntary 
participation and self selection under asymmetric information suggest that the gains from not 
revealing one's true resource situation could be substantial, in our case, 50% larger than when the 
self-selection conditions are ignored. In our case, the group whose payments are substantially above 
those under assumptions of symmetric information own only a small fraction of the total resource 
base, but that need not always be the case. Therefore, the implications for government costs could 
be substantial, and the size of the payment differential is a good indication of the value of collecting 
3 For group 2 producers, the distribution of net returns under (N2's2) does not (lominate the distribution under (N1's1). 
...
This occurs because the yield responses from nitrogen are quite similar for the two groups in the range [Nl.N2]; any 51 
large enough so that (Nl'sl) is preferred by group 1 producers makes the alternatives indistinguishable for group 2 in 
terms of stochastic dominance. This implies that some risk averse decision makers in group 2 may choose group l's 
policy. In our case, Nl < Nz; thus, by choosing group l's policy, group 2 producers would generate further 
improvements in environmental quality beyond the chance constraint. However, their government payments would be 
substantially higher, and if many group 2 producers chose the wrong policy, the impact on total program costs could 
be large. 
13 
infonnation needed to classify fanns for policy design purposes. The value of this infonnation must 
be weighed against the cost of collecting it 
-

..
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